Commit 4dda1c69 authored by jan.koester's avatar jan.koester
Browse files

test

parent 12e2dc4c

docs/ROADMAP.md

+1 −1
Changes for docs/ROADMAP.md: 1 added line, 1 removed line.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ The directory layer maps them onto AD objects and adds generic objects: 
|---|---|---|

| 0 | Rename authdb -> FenrirDirectoryServer (`fenrirds`) | done |

| 1 | Core lib + crypto (MD4/MD5/HMAC-MD5/RC4/AES-CMAC/CFB8/SP800-108) + dsdb | |

| 2 | LDAP: all operations, controls (paged, SD flags, ...), rootDSE, schema entry, SASL GSSAPI/GSS-SPNEGO (Kerberos+NTLM, sign/seal), LDAPS, GC port, CLDAP netlogon ping | bind(simple+SASL GSSAPI)/search/add/modify/delete/modrdn + rootDSE done & wire-tested; SASL GSSAPI bind works end to end (AP-REQ via KDC acceptor, mutual AP-REP, CFX wrap/unwrap sec-layer). TODO: GSS-SPNEGO wrap, sign/seal security layer (SSF>0), controls (paged), schema subentry, LDAPS, GC/CLDAP |

| 2 | LDAP: all operations, controls (paged, SD flags, ...), rootDSE, schema entry, SASL GSSAPI/GSS-SPNEGO (Kerberos+NTLM, sign/seal), LDAPS, GC port, CLDAP netlogon ping | bind(simple+SASL GSSAPI)/search/add/modify/delete/modrdn + rootDSE done & wire-tested; SASL GSSAPI(raw)+GSS-SPNEGO binds, sign transport (SSF=1), CLDAP netlogon done. kinit/kvno/CLDAP interop-proven vs MIT+Samba. TODO: validate GSS-SPNEGO+sign vs Samba ldbsearch (harness flaky this round), seal(SSF=2), paged-results, schema subentry, LDAPS, GC port |

| 3 | LDIF import/export (RFC 2849): library, `fenrirdsctl`, HTTP API, admin UI | |

| 4 | DNS server: AD zones and SRV records, dynamic update (unsigned + GSS-TSIG), forwarding | UDP+TCP server, SRV/A/NS/SOA for domain + _msdcs, generated from directory + configured DC host/IP; wire-tested (dig-style). TODO: directory-backed dnsNode records, dynamic update (RFC2136 + GSS-TSIG), forwarding, AAAA, reverse zones |

| 5 | Kerberos for AD: PAC (logon info, UPN/DNS info, signatures), lookups by sAMAccountName/SPN/UPN, AD salts, RC4-HMAC, kpasswd | KDC on dsdb::Directory (lookups SPN/sAMAccountName($)/UPN, keys from Secrets, krbtgt=TGS key, AD salts). PAC (logon info NDR, client info, UPN/DNS, server+KDC HMAC-SHA1-96 signatures, S-1-22-3 UUID SID in extra SIDs) in TGT + service ticket. AS+TGS wire-tested end to end. TODO: PAC verify on TGS, RC4-HMAC preauth, kpasswd, S4U |

plugin/ad/ad.cpp

+93 −11
Changes for plugin/ad/ad.cpp: 93 added lines, 11 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -497,6 +497,59 @@ void ActiveDirectory::RequestEvent(netplus::con &curcon, const int, ULONG_PTR) { 
    if (!session)

        return;



    namespace gss = fenrirds::crypto::gss;



    /* With a SASL security layer, each message is a 4-byte-length-prefixed GSS

     * token wrapping the LDAP PDU; responses are wrapped the same way. */

    if (session->ssf > 0) {

        size_t consumed = 0;

        while (true) {

            size_t avail = curcon.RecvData.size() - consumed;

            if (avail < 4)

                break;

            const uint8_t *p = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(curcon.RecvData.data()) + consumed;

            uint32_t blen = uint32_t(p[0]) << 24 | uint32_t(p[1]) << 16 | uint32_t(p[2]) << 8 | p[3];

            if (avail - 4 < blen)

                break;

            std::vector<uint8_t> token(p + 4, p + 4 + blen);

            consumed += 4 + blen;



            fenrirds::crypto::Bytes pdu;

            if (!gss::unwrap(session->gssKey, session->gssEtype, false, token, pdu)) {

                /* integrity failure: drop the connection */

                curcon.RecvData.clear();

                return;

            }

            session->recvSeq++;



            /* process the LDAP PDU(s) inside */

            std::vector<uint8_t> responses;

            size_t po = 0;

            while (po < pdu.size()) {

                size_t o = po;

                uint8_t t; const uint8_t *mc; size_t ml;

                if (!LdapBer::parseTLV(pdu.data(), pdu.size(), o, t, mc, ml) || t != LdapBer::TAG_SEQUENCE)

                    break;

                auto r = handleMessage(mc, ml, *session);

                responses.insert(responses.end(), r.begin(), r.end());

                po = o;

            }

            if (!responses.empty()) {

                fenrirds::crypto::Bytes resp(responses.begin(), responses.end());

                auto wrapped = gss::wrap(session->gssKey, session->gssEtype, true, session->sendSeq++, resp);

                uint32_t wl = uint32_t(wrapped.size());

                curcon.SendData.push_back(char(wl >> 24));

                curcon.SendData.push_back(char(wl >> 16));

                curcon.SendData.push_back(char(wl >> 8));

                curcon.SendData.push_back(char(wl));

                curcon.SendData.insert(curcon.SendData.end(), wrapped.begin(), wrapped.end());

            }

        }

        if (consumed > 0)

            curcon.RecvData.erase(curcon.RecvData.begin(), curcon.RecvData.begin() + consumed);

        return;

    }



    const uint8_t *raw = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(curcon.RecvData.data());

    size_t rawLen = curcon.RecvData.size();

    size_t consumed = 0;
@@ -626,7 +679,10 @@ std::vector<uint8_t> ActiveDirectory::handleBindRequest(const uint8_t *content, 
        };

        const int SASL_BIND_IN_PROGRESS = 14;



        if (toLower(mechanism) != "gssapi") {

        namespace gss = fenrirds::crypto::gss;

        std::string mech = toLower(mechanism);

        bool spnego = (mech == "gss-spnego");

        if (mech != "gssapi" && !spnego) {

            session.gssState = LdapSession::GssNone;

            return bindResp(LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED, nullptr);

        }
@@ -634,10 +690,20 @@ std::vector<uint8_t> ActiveDirectory::handleBindRequest(const uint8_t *content, 
            return bindResp(LDAP_AUTH_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED, nullptr);



        if (session.gssState == LdapSession::GssNone) {

            uint16_t tokId = 0;

            std::vector<uint8_t> apReq;

            if (!fenrirds::crypto::gss::parseInitialToken(inTok, tokId, apReq))

            session.gssSpnego = spnego;

            if (spnego) {

                std::vector<uint8_t> mechToken;

                if (!gss::parseSpnegoInit(inTok, mechToken, session.gssMechTypes))

                    return bindResp(LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, nullptr);

                uint16_t id = 0;

                if (!gss::parseInitialToken(mechToken, id, apReq))

                    return bindResp(LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, nullptr);

            } else {

                uint16_t id = 0;

                if (!gss::parseInitialToken(inTok, id, apReq))

                    return bindResp(LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, nullptr);

            }

            GssAcceptResult res;

            if (!g_KdcPlugin->gssAccept(apReq, res))

                return bindResp(LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, nullptr);
@@ -645,26 +711,42 @@ std::vector<uint8_t> ActiveDirectory::handleBindRequest(const uint8_t *content, 
            session.gssEtype = res.sessionEtype;

            session.gssClient = res.clientPrincipal;

            session.gssState = LdapSession::GssSentApRep;

            std::vector<uint8_t> creds;



            std::vector<uint8_t> krb5reply;

            if (!res.apRep.empty()) {

                creds = {0x02, 0x00};   /* GSS AP-REP token id, no 0x60 wrapper */

                creds.insert(creds.end(), res.apRep.begin(), res.apRep.end());

                krb5reply = {0x02, 0x00};   /* GSS AP-REP token id */

                krb5reply.insert(krb5reply.end(), res.apRep.begin(), res.apRep.end());

            }

            std::vector<uint8_t> creds;

            if (spnego) {

                std::vector<uint8_t> krb5oid(gss::KRB5_OID, gss::KRB5_OID + 11);

                std::vector<uint8_t> mic = gss::getMic(session.gssKey, session.gssEtype,

                                                       true, 0, session.gssMechTypes);

                creds = gss::buildSpnegoResp(gss::ACCEPT_COMPLETED, &krb5oid, krb5reply, mic);

            } else {

                creds = krb5reply;

            }

            return bindResp(SASL_BIND_IN_PROGRESS, &creds);

        }



        if (session.gssState == LdapSession::GssSentApRep) {

            /* offer the SASL security layer: none (0x01), max message size 0 */

            std::vector<uint8_t> sec = {0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};

            auto tok = fenrirds::crypto::gss::wrap(session.gssKey, session.gssEtype, true, 0, sec);

            /* offer the SASL security layer: none|integrity|confidentiality,

             * with a max receive buffer. Wrapped (sign) with the context key. */

            uint32_t maxBuf = 0x000FFFFF;

            std::vector<uint8_t> sec = {0x03, uint8_t(maxBuf >> 16), uint8_t(maxBuf >> 8), uint8_t(maxBuf)};

            auto tok = gss::wrap(session.gssKey, session.gssEtype, true, session.sendSeq++, sec);

            session.gssState = LdapSession::GssSentSecLayer;

            return bindResp(SASL_BIND_IN_PROGRESS, &tok);

        }



        /* GssSentSecLayer: client's wrapped layer choice + authzid */

        /* GssSentSecLayer: client's wrapped layer choice (+authzid) */

        fenrirds::crypto::Bytes plain;

        if (!fenrirds::crypto::gss::unwrap(session.gssKey, session.gssEtype, false, inTok, plain))

        if (!gss::unwrap(session.gssKey, session.gssEtype, false, inTok, plain) || plain.size() < 4)

            return bindResp(LDAP_INVALID_CREDENTIALS, nullptr);

        uint8_t layer = plain[0];

        session.ssf = (layer & 0x04) ? 2 : (layer & 0x02) ? 1 : 0;

        session.recvSeq = 1;   /* the sec-layer tokens consumed seq 0 each way */

        session.sendSeq = 1;

        session.authenticated = true;

        session.bindDN = session.gssClient;

        session.gssState = LdapSession::GssNone;

plugin/ad/ad.h

+9 −1
Changes for plugin/ad/ad.h: 9 added lines, 1 removed line.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -209,11 +209,19 @@ namespace fenrirds { 
        uuid::uuid   userUid;        /* UUID if bound as a user          */

        std::string  realm;          /* domain realm for the session     */



        /* SASL GSSAPI state */

        /* SASL GSSAPI / GSS-SPNEGO state */

        enum GssState { GssNone, GssSentApRep, GssSentSecLayer } gssState = GssNone;

        std::vector<uint8_t> gssKey;        /* the context session key */

        int                  gssEtype = 0;

        std::string          gssClient;     /* client principal name@REALM */

        bool                 gssSpnego = false;

        std::vector<uint8_t> gssMechTypes; /* DER of the client's MechTypeList (for the MIC) */



        /* established SASL security layer (after a successful GSSAPI bind):

         * ssf 0 = none, 1 = integrity (sign), 2 = confidentiality (seal) */

        int                  ssf = 0;

        uint64_t             sendSeq = 0;   /* acceptor -> client */

        uint64_t             recvSeq = 0;   /* client -> acceptor */

    };



    /***************************************************************************

plugin/krb5/krb5.cpp

+13 −1
Changes for plugin/krb5/krb5.cpp: 13 added lines, 1 removed line.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1670,6 +1670,10 @@ bool Asn1Der::parseAuthenticator(const uint8_t *data, size_t len, 
                if (parseTLV(content, content_len, ioff, itag, icontent, icontent_len))

                    parseGeneralizedTime(icontent, icontent_len, auth.ctime);

                break;

            case 6: /* subkey (EncryptionKey) — the GSS context key */

                if (parseEncryptionKey(content, content_len, auth.subkey))

                    auth.has_subkey = true;

                break;

            case 7: /* seq-number */

                if (parseTLV(content, content_len, ioff, itag, icontent, icontent_len))

                    parseUInteger(icontent, icontent_len, auth.seq_number);
@@ -3631,10 +3635,18 @@ bool Krb5KDC::gssAccept(const std::vector<uint8_t> &apReqData, GssAcceptResult & 
        return false;



    out.clientPrincipal = et.cname.name + "@" + et.cname.realm;

    /* GSS uses the authenticator subkey as the context key when the client

     * sent one (MIT/Samba/Windows do); otherwise the ticket session key. */

    if (auth.has_subkey && !auth.subkey.keydata.empty()) {

        out.sessionKey = auth.subkey.keydata;

        out.sessionEtype = auth.subkey.enctype;

    } else {

        out.sessionKey = et.session_key.keydata;

        out.sessionEtype = et.session_key.enctype;

    }



    /* KRB5_AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED = 0x20000000 */

    /* KRB5_AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED = 0x20000000: the AP-REP enc-part is

     * encrypted with the TICKET session key (not the subkey). */

    if (ap.ap_options & 0x20000000) {

        Krb5Service svc("", "", ap.ticket.sname.realm, svcKey);

        out.apRep = svc.buildApRep(auth, et.session_key);

plugin/krb5/krb5.h

+2 −0
Changes for plugin/krb5/krb5.h: 2 added lines, 0 removed lines.
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -470,6 +470,8 @@ namespace fenrirds { 
        time_t           ctime;               /* client time           */

        uint32_t         cusec;               /* microseconds          */

        uint32_t         seq_number;          /* sequence number       */

        Krb5SessionKey   subkey;              /* [6] subkey (GSS context key) */

        bool             has_subkey = false;



        Krb5Authenticator();